Dynamics of firm participation in R&D tax credit and subsidy programs by Busom i Piquer, Isabel et al.
Dynamics of firm participation in R&D 
tax credit and subsidy programs
Isabel Busom, Beatriz 
Corchuelo, Ester Martínez-Ros
15.03
Departament d'Economia Aplicada
Facultat d'Economia i Empresa 
Aquest document pertany al Departament d'Economia Aplicada.
Data de publicació : 
Departament d'Economia Aplicada
Edifici B
Campus de Bellaterra
08193 Bellaterra
Telèfon: 93 581 1680
Fax: 93 581 2292
E-mail: d.econ.aplicada@uab.es
http://www.uab.cat/departament/economia-aplicada/
Març  2015
1 
 
DYNAMICS OF FIRM PARTICIPATION IN R&D TAX CREDIT 
AND SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 
 
Isabel Busom a*, Beatriz Corchuelo b and Ester Martínez-Ros c  
March 12, 2015  
 
a*Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Departament d’Economia Aplicada, Edifici B, 08193 
Bellaterra, Spain. Corresponding author. 
bUniversidad de Extremadura, Departamento de Economía, Avda Elvas, Badajoz, Spain 
cUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departamento de Economía de la Empresa, Getafe, Spain 
Abstract  
We provide comparative evidence on R&D tax credit and subsidy programs by studying 
whether firms' participation in each program exhibits state dependence and whether 
cross program interactions exist and are significant. We use a panel of manufacturing 
Spanish firms, which could use both types of support, to estimate a random effects 
bivariate dynamic probit model of program participation. We find that true state 
dependence of participation in R&D subsidy and tax credit programs accounts 
respectively for about 55% and 60% of observed persistence. In contrast, we do not find 
evidence of cross program interaction, suggesting that each tool is used by firms with 
different profiles. Digging on the role of some observable variables, we find that both 
programs reach on average stable R&D performers, and that they do not foster 
participation of young firms relative to older ones. We also identify significant 
differences across programs: while diversified and commercially successful firms are 
more likely to use tax incentives, those with high productivity are more likely to obtain 
subsidies. We discuss some policy implications of these findings.  
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1. Introduction. 
Governments in developed countries allocate public resources -up to 0.4% of Gross 
Domestic Product- to support business research and development (R&D) through tax 
incentive and subsidy programs, alongside with intellectual property protection. The 
first two policy instruments are currently offered simultaneously in most OECD 
countries, although with varying emphasis: while in the US the tax incentive share of 
total government support for R&D was about 23% in 2011, in France this share was 
70% (OECD (2014)). As with any policy intervention, a number of questions arise 
concerning the efficiency of each tool individually and as policy mix and their ex post 
impact on productivity growth both at the micro and macro levels arise.  
A particularly controversial issue is whether it is best to rely on tax incentives than on 
direct support or vice versa. Extant evidence does not yet offer an answer to this 
question. Most studies have analyzed separately these two forms of support, 
disregarding the fact that in many countries both programs are simultaneously available 
to firms and consequently producing potentially biased impact estimates.1 Their main 
focus has been testing whether R&D subsidy or tax incentive programs induce 
substitution of private for public funding, or on the contrary they induce positive 
additional private R&D effort.2 In the case of direct funding studies for countries where 
tax incentives are not offered reject the hypothesis of full replacement of private by 
public funding. As for R&D tax incentives, aggregate estimates of the impact of tax 
incentives have suggested they may increase R&D intensity (Bloom et al. (2002)) but 
recent micro level studies find evidence of partial crowding out when beneficiaries are 
large firms (Lokshin and Mohnen (2012)). In addition there is no country where no 
direct support but only tax incentives are offered, so these estimates may be potentially 
biased.  
In addition to the potential bias just referred to, impact estimates, although valuable as 
they are to discard crowding out effects, do not provide a complete picture of the ex-
post efficiency of R&D subsidy and tax incentive programs. First, they do not inform 
                                                           
1An exception is the study by Haegeland and Moen (2007) for the Norwegian case. 
2
 In this literature, the ability of public support to induce more private R&D investment is known as input 
additionality. Some also estimate the impact of each program on outcomes such as patenting and 
innovation, known as output additionality. 
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about the success of each program in addressing the potential market failures that are 
associated with some types of R&D or other innovation activities that justify public 
support, as discussed in Toivanen et al. (2013) and Busom et al. (2014). Second, 
additionality estimates do not reveal whether potential and unintended barriers to 
program take up exist. In particular, a program might systematically reach only a subset 
of targeted firms; or both programs might repeatedly benefit the same set of firms, 
which could potentially signal allocation inefficiencies, especially if potentially eligible 
entrants are excluded. Comparative evidence on how these instruments interact, the 
profiles of firms each effectively reaches, and which are their long-term effects, is 
virtually missing.  
We contribute to the field by performing a joint examination of participation patterns in 
each program and their dynamics.3 We address two main questions: i) is the pool of 
firms that benefit from each policy always the same, or are entry and exit rates 
significant?; and ii) does receiving a subsidy increase the chances a firm will use tax 
incentives in the future, and vice versa? The first question involves testing whether 
participation in one of these programs predicts future participation in the same program, 
that is, the extent of inertia or state dependence. Strong state dependence would suggest 
that the same firms repeatedly benefit from that particular program. On the positive side 
this may simply reflect that some firms' R&D projects always involve significant 
spillovers and are thus permanently eligible for public support. On the negative side, 
persistence may signal that once a firm participates, further participation follows 
irrespective of project features, potentially reflecting success at rent-seeking; it also 
would indicate that the program fails at attracting potentially eligible new firms. The 
later cases warn that allocation mistakes become permanent, with the subsequent 
welfare costs. Where the purpose of the policy is to increase the number of firms that 
invest in R&D (the extensive margin) rather than the investment effort of those that 
already invest (the intensive margin), program persistence would hint at a policy failure. 
                                                           
3
 Program participation has not been the main focus of evaluation research, with some exceptions (Blanes 
and Busom (2004); Aschhoff (2010), Huergo and Trenado (2010); Busom et al. (2014), Czarnitzki et al. 
(2014)). Aschhoff (2010) is the only study on participation persistence in direct support programs. She 
investigates whether in Germany firms that obtain subsidies are always the same, or whether the 
composition of the pool of participants changes over time. She finds that participation is very stable, and 
that entry rate into the program is very low, concluding that the scheme seemingly failed at attracting 
SMEs, which was one of the aims of the program.  
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The second question bears on the dynamic interaction between R&D subsidies and tax 
incentives: participation in one program may predict future participation in the other -
the extent of cross-persistence. High cross-persistence from subsidies to tax credits 
would imply that the first program has long term budgetary consequences that should be 
taken into account when designing the subsidy program. Cross-persistence from tax 
credits to subsidies would instead suggest that firms that already invest in R&D are able 
to undertake R&D projects that match the public agency's preferences, beyond private 
profit considerations, which would be a desirable policy outcome. 
To investigate these issues we analyze a longitudinal firm-level dataset of Spanish 
manufacturing firms, with yearly observations from 2001 to 2008. R&D subsidies and 
tax credits have been in place simultaneously since before 1995, when a new corporate 
tax law substantially increased incentives for R&D investment. The panel nature of the 
data allows us to identify the extent of state dependence for both programs, controlling 
for unobserved individual heterogeneity. Our results show that participation in R&D tax 
credit and subsidy programs is only partially driven by unobserved heterogeneity and 
that true state-dependence accounts for about 55% of observed persistence in the case of 
subsidies, and 60% in the case of tax credits. No evidence of cross-program spillovers is 
found. In addition, some observed firm features appear to have a different effect on the 
likelihood of participating in each program: higher productivity than the industry 
average is positively correlated with participating in R&D subsidy programs, but not 
with claiming tax credits. A firm's position as a market leader and an increasing market 
share contribute to the firm's claiming tax incentives, but not to the probability of 
obtaining subsidies. Young firms are not more or less likely to participate in any of 
these programs than older firms, but firms that were performing R&D at the beginning 
of the period are more likely to participate in both, as well as large firms.  
These results suggest that, given macroeconomic and other framework conditions 
prevailing during the period analyzed, R&D tax incentives and subsidy programs in 
Spain were attractive mostly for incumbents -firms that were already performing R&D-, 
and that tax incentives appealed particularly to commercially successful firms, casting 
doubts on the ability of the latter to correct market failures.  
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The paper layout is as follows. In section 2 we discuss previous evidence on the 
dynamics of R&D and present some hypotheses regarding R&D policy participation. 
Section 3 describes the data we use in this investigation, while in section 4 we outline 
the empirical model. In section 5 we discuss our set of estimation results and conclude 
in section 6.  
2. The dynamics of R&D and R&D program participation. 
Empirical research has uncovered a number of regularities related to business R&D 
investment. One of them is the positive association between firm size and the 
probability of investing in R&D, and an often negative one between size and R&D 
intensity.4 More recently, empirical studies have found a high level of persistence of 
R&D investment and innovation (Peters (2009) and Peters et al. (2013)); Martínez-Ros 
and Labeaga (2009); Raymond et al. (2010), Huergo and Moreno (2011); Antonelli et al 
(2012)). Several explanations have been proposed for observed persistence. Some 
authors argue that R&D investment involves entry and exit fixed costs lead to state-
dependence (Mañez et al (2009); Arqué and Mohnen (2015)); others show that 
persistence is correlated with features such as the number of competitors (Woerter 
(2014)); or suggest to learning effects (Geroski et al. (1997); Triguero et al. (2014)). In 
addition, commercially successful innovation may foster more R&D investment 
because it provides firms with internal funds, alleviating innovation-specific financing 
constraints. These considerations suggest that R&D persistence may carry over to 
participation in R&D support programs: these may be more attractive to firms that are 
regular R&D performers; in addition, benefiting once from a program would make it 
more likely to keep benefiting from it over time, unless the program places some 
restrictions to continued support and favoring new entrants.  
 
Whether participation persistence is a positive outcome or not will depend on whether it 
is associated to some permanent underlying market failure, which is what justifies the 
program's existence. For instance, Busom et al. (2014) find that firms that face 
difficulties to finance innovation, whether from internal or external sources, are more 
likely to obtain subsidies, and less likely to claim tax credits, suggesting that the latter 
                                                           
4
 See for instance the results of empirical research based on the well known Crepon-Duguet-Mairesse 
model, which distinguishes between firms' decision to invest on R&D from the intensity of R&D effort. 
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may not be an appropriate tool to address this specific problem. Then, unless a tax credit 
provides some compensation for limited appropriability, then such a scheme would only 
provide windfall gains to firms, at a social cost. This cost would be higher for volume-
based tax incentive systems than for incremental systems. If participation in an R&D 
tax credit program exhibits persistence, then program design or implementation 
mistakes are likely to endure, involving negative welfare effects. Consequently, this 
finding would underscore the need for careful program design and ex-post evaluation.  
 
Ongoing work on endogenous growth theory illustrates the relevance of a careful choice 
of innovation policy instrument. In particular, Akcigit et al. (2014) develop a model to 
evaluate alternative innovation policies that differ in their ability to discriminate across 
R&D types: a uniform subsidy and a selective subsidy. Their model incorporates some 
observed empirical regularities on the nature of R&D activities. These are, first, the 
heterogeneity of R&D projects in terms of their spillover potential -the standard 
classification into basic and applied research, or into exploration versus exploitation, 
approximates this idea. And second one refers to the diversity in the extent of product 
diversification, size and market position as entrant or incumbent across firms. This 
heterogeneity is expected to shape incentives to pursue each type of R&D, which in turn 
will influence for the optimal innovation policy instrument choice. Akcigit et al. 
compare the impact of each policy on firms' allocation of resources to basic and applied 
research, on productivity growth and on welfare. Using French firm level data, they find 
that a uniform subsidy leads to overinvestment in applied research and lower welfare 
than policies that discriminate between different innovation types.  
 
In a similar vein, Akcigit and Kerr (2010, 2012), assume two possible types of R&D: 
exploration and exploitation activities. Exploration R&D aims at introducing new 
products to obtain technology leadership and yield higher spillovers than exploitation 
R&D, whose purpose is to improve existing product lines. Akcigit and Kerr establish 
that SMEs (entrants) have a comparative advantage for exploration R&D; therefore, an 
efficient innovation policy should target mostly the former type of firms. Consequently, 
we should expect low to moderate persistence of support if a policy succeeds at 
promoting more exploration than exploitation activities.  
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In our case, the two programs we compare also differ in the extent of discrimination 
across R&D projects. Direct support through subsidies allows the public agency to 
select those that fulfill some specific conditions: either the project is socially valuable 
but not sufficiently profitable for the firm -because of spillovers or technical risk- or the 
firm faces innovation specific financing constraints. To be eligible for support through 
tax incentives a firm has to show that its R&D investment aims at developing a product 
or process that provides substantial novelty at the market level, but not that the social 
value of the project is higher than private return or that it cannot fund the project.5  
 
We expect participation dynamics across these two programs to differ because, even if 
both R&D subsidies and tax credits decrease the private cost of investing in R&D, 
features such as actual eligibility, timing, certainty and quantity of support they provide 
firms vary across programs (Busom et al. (2014)). Tax incentives are a non-
discriminatory policy that will be attractive to firms that are able to finance -with own 
or external funds- their R&D investment and obtain positive taxable income.6 Tax 
credits are claimed after successful R&D investment; in addition, the amount claimed 
can be constrained by the magnitude of profits. R&D subsidies, on the contrary, are 
intended to be discriminatory -based on the quality, cost and other attributes of a firm's 
R&D project- and offer upfront, partially non-repayable funding to approved projects. 
These differences may not only affect incentives to participate in each program, but 
participation trajectories as well. 
 
In the case of tax incentives we expect participation persistence to be high for the 
following reasons. Established firms with a limited number of competitors, large or 
diversified firms, might benefit repeatedly from R&D tax incentives simply because 
they are less likely to suffer from innovation barriers, more likely to embark in an 
exploitation type of R&D, and more likely to generate positive taxable income on a 
regular basis than SMEs, firms with many competitors or new firms, all of which 
                                                           
5
 In Spain the tax code distinguishes between market and firm level novelty. In the second case a firm that 
adopts an innovation can still claim a tax credit but the rate is much lower. 
6
 Within tax incentive schemes, there is a high variety of designs. Some offer tax breaks from the 
corporate income tax, others from payroll and social security taxes, or from the value added tax. Some 
countries offer combinations of all. In addition, they may be based on R&D volume or incremental 
expenditure; include special provisions for young firms and SMEs; contemplate cash refunds, carry-
forwards, ceilings to deductions.... Here we assume that incentives are based on corporate income tax 
deductions, because this is the design affecting firms in our dataset.  
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frequently obtain lower profits. In addition, successful innovations not only increase 
profits but also the firm’s internal funds, and consequently its ability to keep investing 
in R&D. This mechanism is consistent with the hypothesis of "success-breeds-success", 
and a tax incentive scheme would reinforce it.7  
 
Participation persistence in R&D subsidy programs is a priori indeterminate. On one 
hand, the government agency may mostly target firms in one or several of the following 
categories: new firms; firms that face high R&D fixed costs; firms that lack funding for 
innovation, firms whose projects exhibit limited appropriability but have high social 
value. In these cases support may be intended as a temporary lever for firms to embark 
in innovation or to perform specific types of projects, like those of an exploratory 
nature. We would expect firm participation turnover to be high and therefore persistence 
low. On the other hand public agencies may select ambitious, lengthy R&D projects 
exhibiting technical uncertainty, fixed costs and long term spillovers; these projects may 
require continuous funding to keep them going, and public support would induce 
persistence in participation.8  
 
Cross-program interactions may take place. Recipients of direct support may be in a 
position to claim tax credits in future periods, especially if support allows the firm to 
make profits from resulting innovations, as would be expected if the subsidy aims at 
easing funding constraints rather than compensating for limited appropriability. In this 
case R&D subsidies may enable firms to use tax credits in the future, leading to cross-
persistence of tax credits with respect to subsidies. On the other hand, some of the firms 
that enjoy tax credits may be interested in undertaking projects that fulfill the 
requirements of the public agency, in particular if at some point they face financing 
constraints. We now turn to testing these hypotheses. 
 
                                                           
7
 The concern that tax incentive persistence may signal that this scheme could protect incumbents against 
innovative entrants has been pointed out by Bravo Biosca, Criscuolo and Menon (2012). 
8
 This is a plausible situation when projects involve pre-competitive research, and when renewal of 
support is conditional on the project's technical or scientific results. Arqué and Mohnen (2014), who 
study the effects of public support on private R&D investment, conclude that for sustained R&D 
investment some firms may need continuation subsidies. This would breed persistence in direct support. 
Information on product duration would be needed to disentangle this source of persistence from true state 
dependence. 
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3. Data 
Our data source is a firm-level annual survey sponsored by the Ministry of Industry of 
Spain since 1990, the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE hereafter). It 
samples manufacturing firms with 10 or more employees, contains information on 
firms’ products, employment, markets and technological activities, and is a true panel. 
Since its inception it includes questions on a firm's R&D investment and use of direct 
public support (loans and grants); in 2001 new questions concerning the use of tax 
incentives were added.9 Since our purpose is to compare the use of both policy 
instruments, we use data from 2001 to 2008, which was a period of economic growth.   
 
Spain’s R&D tax incentive scheme, exclusively offered by the central government, is 
designed as a hybrid system, combining volume and incremental based deductions from 
the firm’s owed tax. The amount of deduction that can be claimed cannot exceed a 
ceiling that varies according to firm size, but any excess claim can be carried over to 
future periods. There are no refunds for firms without positive taxable income.10 In 
2008, about 3150 firms claimed tax credits for a total of 326Mio€, which account for 
roughly 4% of in-house R&D investment. About 75% of this volume was claimed by 
large firms. Although absolute magnitudes are much larger in the US, in relative terms 
the picture is not much different: according to a report from the US Government 
Accountability Office, in 2005 the net credit claimed accounted for about 4.5% of 
qualified research expenses (GAO (2009)).11 
 
Unlike R&D tax credits, three jurisdictions offer R&D subsidies: Spain’s central 
administration, regional governments and the European Union. In this paper we focus 
exclusively on the first source of funding because for Spanish firms it is the main source 
of funds and because differences in each jurisdiction goals are likely to generate 
different dynamics. During 2001 to 2008, the volume of subsidies provided through the 
                                                           
9
 In ESEE, all firms with more than 200 employees are surveyed as well as a random sample of firms with 
10 to 200 employees, stratified by activity and size intervals defined by employment (10-20, 21-50, 51-
100 and 101-200). A complete description of sampling procedures and questionnaires can be found in 
https://www.fundacionsepi.es/esee/en/epresentacion.asp . It is possibly one of the few data sets that 
provide information on a firm's use of both types of support.   
10
 For a detailed comparative description of R&D tax schemes in OECD countries, see 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm#design. According to OECD estimates, the implied tax subsidy 
rates for Spain are among the highest among member countries. There are no additional tax incentives 
from regional or local administrations in Spain. 
11
 See GAO (2009), Table 3, page 53. 
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specialized government agency, the CDTI, was about three times as large as that of tax 
credits, a proportion similar to the US.12  
 
Our initial sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 2827 firms from 2001 to 2008 
with a total of about 13000 observations of 2827 firms. 29% of them have more than 
200 employees, and 21 % are in high or medium technology industries. On average, 
36% conduct R&D, whether internal or external; 12% claim R&D tax credits and 7% 
participate in subsidy programs over the whole period. We extract from this sample a 
balanced panel of 779 firms that account for 6232 observations (47% of all 
observations). Firm size and industry composition of both panels are very similar, as 
tables below will show.  
 
With two R&D programs and two participation options, each firm will be each year in 
one of four possible situations: not participating in any program, participating in both, 
participating in only one of them. We thus define a participation status variable that 
reflects a firm’s state in a given year. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the share of firms 
in each possible state.13 Notice that the share of firms that use only tax credits is higher 
than the share of firms that use only subsidies or both types of support up to 2006, when 
it falls. In contrast, the share of those participating exclusively in the subsidy program 
increases over this period; although lowest in 2001, it overtakes the remaining shares at 
the end of the period. The drop of the participation rate in tax credits possibly reflects to 
some extent a fall in profits as the economic crisis was just starting.  
  
                                                           
12
 Different types of subsidies are offered by the public agency; some are loans with or without non-
returnable part and some are grants. 
13
 We observe that each year about 1373 firms (82% of the total) did not participate in any of the 
programs, 85 obtained subsidies, 110 obtained tax credits, and 95 obtained both. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of participation status 
Percentage of firms that obtain support by type 
Unbalanced panel    Balanced Panel 
 
In the unbalanced panel, the number of firms each year oscillates from 1300 in 2001 to 2023 in 2006; the 
average is 1664 firms. The balanced panel contains 779 firms.  
Data source: ESEE 
 
Table 1 shows the transition rates across participation state, that is, the probability of a 
firm changing or remaining in the same status across two consecutive periods. The table 
highlights that i) the vast majority of non-participants (96%) remain in that state the 
following year; only 4% change status; ii) among firms that participate exclusively in 
one of the programs, the chances of remaining in the same program are still high -about 
60%- but about one fourth lose all support the following period; iii) there are no 
remarkable differences between participants in exclusively one of the programs; and iv) 
firms that participate in both programs are quite likely to stay in this status. Note that 
probability cells are very similar for both the unbalanced and balanced panels. The 
general pattern is thus of strong persistence, which may be driven by heterogeneity or 
by true state dependence. In the next section we’ll try to disentangle this. 
 
Table 1. Transition rates across participation status. 
  Status in t+1 
Status in t Num observ. No support Only Subsidy Only Tax Credit Both Total 
A. Unbalanced Panel        
No support 8630 95.9 1.6 1.9 0.5 100 
Only Subs 508 23.4 59.7 3.0 14.0 100 
Only Tax Credit 726 27.2 1.9 60.4 10.5 100 
Both 613 6.4 14.0 11.1 68.5 100 
Total 10477 82.4 5.2 6.6 5.6 100 
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B. Balanced panel       
No support 4429 95.8 1.6 2.1 0.5 100 
Only Subs 249 22.9 61.8 1.2 14.1 100 
Only Tax Credit 416 27.6 1.0 61.3 10.1 100 
Both 359 6.7 11.7 11.4 70.2 100 
Total 5453 81.4 4.9 7.2 6.5 100 
Note: the total number of observations here is smaller than the number in Figure 1 because firms that do 
not remain in the panel for at least two consecutive years had to be dropped. 
 
We find differences in transition patterns across firm size: SMEs that did not benefit 
from subsidies at time t, have a probability of 2.6% of doing so the following year 
(independently of whether firms also obtain tax credits); for large firms, this probability 
is quite higher (6.6%). Likewise, the likelihood of exiting the program varies across 
firm size: 32% for SMEs and 28% for large firms. With respect to tax credits, the 
probability of claiming them when not doing so the previous period is 3% for SMEs, 
and the probability of stopping claiming is 25% ; for large firms these probabilities are 
8% and 22% respectively. There seems to be a significant difference at the entry stage 
across firm size.  
 
We observe that persistence in performing R&D is very high in our unbalanced panel: 
96% of non-doing firm-observations remain in the same situation the following period, 
and of R&D doers, 90% remain so.14 Again these percentages are averages that hide 
significant differences across firm size. One fifth of SMEs invest in R&D, and their 
chances of switching from not-doing to doing so is only 3%; similarly, the likelihood of 
stopping is high (16%). In contrast, about 70% of large firms perform R&D, and the 
likelihood of switching from not doing to doing is higher (10%), while the likelihood of 
discontinuing is lower (6%). This description is consistent with the well known 
hypothesis that SMEs face significant hurdles to engage in and sustain R&D 
investment. We find a comparable pattern if we focus on firm age.    
 
We now focus on the transition patterns of the subsample of firms that invest in R&D at 
least once during this period, which is about one third of firms. About 40% of these 
benefit from tax credits, and 35% from subsidies. That less than half of potential 
beneficiaries of tax credits actually claim them, when in principle the procedure to do it 
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 R&D transition rates are very similar to those obtained by Huergo and Moreno (2011) for the period 
1990-2005. Exit is more frequently observed than entry. 
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is easy, suggests the presence of some barriers to program participation. When we 
compute transition probabilities for the subset of R&D performers at time t, we observe 
patterns that are similar to those obtained with the whole sample of firms; the main 
difference being that there is now more entry from no support into some support status, 
in particular to tax credits. Table 2 shows the results, which are again comparable across 
the balanced and unbalanced panels.  
 
Table 2. Transition rates across participation status.  
Subsample of firms with positive R&D expenditure at t 
  Status in t+1 
Status in t N observ No support Only Subs Only Tax 
Credit 
Both Total 
A. Unbalanced panel       
No support 1260 83.3 6.3 7.5 2.9 100 
Only Subs 422 17.8 64.5 3.3 14.5 100 
Only Tax Credit 601 22.3 2.2 64.4 11.2 100 
Both 584 4.6 14.0 10.6 70.7 100 
Total 2867 44.9 15.6 19.5 20.1 100 
B. Balanced panel       
No support 730 83.3 6.2 8.1 2.5 100 
Only Subs 214 18.2 65.4 0.9 15.4 100 
Only Tax Credit 357 22.7 1.1 65.3 10.9 100 
Both 345 4.4 11.6 11.3 72.8 100 
Total 1646 45.1 13.9 20.2 20.7 100 
 
4. Estimation Strategy  
 
We specify a two-equation dynamic model to analyze the extent and origins of 
persistence of a firm’s participation in R&D programs. The dependent variables are the 
unobserved likelihood of participating in the subsidy scheme, and the unobserved 
likelihood of participating in the tax credit scheme. Since we only observe participation 
status, we define two binary indicator variables yjit where j=1 refers to firm i' s status 
regarding R&D subsidies in year t, and j=2 refers to status with respect to tax credits. 
We assume that both latent variables are a function of the firm's participation in each 
14 
 
program the previous year, 1jity − ; a set of lagged observable variables 1jitx −
15; 
unobservable time-invariant firm-specific effects, jiη  and a time-varying random error 
term jitu . The model is: 
 
*
1 11 1 1 12 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
*
2 21 1 1 22 2 1 2 2 1 2 2
it it it it i it
it it it it i it
y y y x u
y y y x u
γ γ β η
γ γ β η
− − −
− − −
= + + + +
= + + + +
    [1] 
* 11 0
with    and   
10
ujit
jit u
u
y
y
else
ρ
ρ
 >  
= Σ =  
  
 
The individual specific unobserved permanent component ηji allows individuals who are 
homogenous in their observed characteristics to be heterogeneous in unobserved 
permanent features. They are assumed to be bivariate normal with variances σ2η1, σ2η2 
and covariance ρη ση1 ση2.  
 
Unobserved individual effects, ηji, may be correlated with observable characteristics as 
well as with the initial condition yji0. To consistently estimate the univariate dynamic 
model, Wooldridge (2005) proposed a Conditional Maximum Likelihood approach, 
where the individual effect is assumed to depend on the initial conditions, yji0 and all 
lagged values of each exogenous variable -excluding the initial value for xi, xi0. In 
practice, researchers often use a constrained version of the model where the lags of 
exogenous variables are replaced by the time average of each exogenous variable, kix
16: 
For the bivariate case, the specification is:  
 
11 10 11 1 0 12 2 0 13 1
22 20 21 1 0 22 2 0 23 1
ii i i i
ii i i i
y y x
y y x
η α α α α ε
η α α α α ε
= + + + +
= + + + +
    [2] 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013) suggest that using Mundlak means jix  might be 
overly restrictive, because it imposes the same coefficient on the initial value of x and 
remaining periods. They show that for short panels this may lead to biased estimates, 
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 We include lagged instead of current values of explanatory variables so that they can be considered as 
predetermined.   
16
 This term, known as Mundlak means, refers to Mundlak (1978)'s proposal to relax the assumption that  
observed and unobserved variables are uncorrelated. 
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and propose including the initial values of independent variables separately from their 
mean in subsequent periods.17 Thus, for the bivariate case, 
 
11 10 11 1 0 12 2 0 13 1 0 14 1
22 20 21 1 0 22 2 0 23 2 0 24 1
'
'
ii i i i i
ii i i i i
y y x x
y y x x
η α α α α α ε
η α α α α α ε
= + + + + +
= + + + + +
   [3] 
where 0  and 'ji jix x  are, respectively the initial values of independent variables and the 
within-mean of each independent variable excluding the initial period. The covariance 
matrix of the random effects εji is: 
2
1 1 2
2
1 2 2
  
ε ε ε ε
ε
ε ε ε ε
σ ρ σ σ
ρ σ σ σ
 
Σ =  
 
 
 
Inserting [2] into [1] we obtain: 
*
11 11 1 1 12 2 1 1 1 1 10 11 1 0 21 2 0 13 1 0 14 1 1
*
22 21 1 1 22 2 1 2 2 1 20 21 1 0 22 2 0 23 2 0 24 2 2
'
'
iit it it it i i i i it
iit it it it i i i i it
y y y x y y x x u
y y y x y y x x u
γ γ β α α α α α ε
γ γ β α α α α α ε
− − −
− − −
= + + + + + + + + +
= + + + + + + + + +
 [3] 
 
The contribution of unobserved heterogeneity to total variance of each equation is 
measured by ( )2 2 2/j j ujε ερ σ σ σ= + . The main parameters of interest are 
11 12 21 22,  ,   and γ γ γ γ . We also wish to test the role of some observed characteristics of 
firms in explaining program participation. These are mainly relative productivity, 
human capital, firm size and age, which jointly with industry type are standard 
predictors of R&D and innovation activities (Peters et al. (2013)).  
 
We first estimate and compare specifications [2] and [3].18 We will later consider 
adding a second lag of each dependent variable for two main reasons. First, firms can 
carry-forward tax credit deductions when these exceed the legal threshold percentage –
the ceiling- of their tax liability. In our balanced panel, about 9% (6%) of firms that 
obtain a tax credit at t did not perform R&D at t-1 (t), which is an indicator of the extent 
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 Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013) show through a series of Monte Carlo experiments that when the 
initial period of explanatory variables are included in the model the bias practically disappears.  
18
 For an application of [4] see Devicienti and Poggi (2011). We adapt their Stata code, publicly available 
at  http://web.econ.unito.it/fdevic/programs.htm,  to our case. Estimation of the random effects bivariate 
dynamic probit model is performed by simulated maximum likelihood. 
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of the use of carry-forward opportunities. Second, subsidies may be awarded for more 
than one year. Both situations might be a source of second-order state dependence. 
Table 3 shows the frequency of participation over the period: we observe that only 
about one third of firms obtained a subsidy or a tax credit once, and that in the balanced 
panel a high percentage of firms did so four years or more.  
 
Table 3. Frequency of participation over the period. 
Note: In the unbalanced panel 17% of firms obtain subsidies, and 19% claim tax credits. In the balanced 
panel, the percentages are 21% and 26% respectively.  
 
5. Results.  
We estimate the random effects dynamic model specified in equation [2] above (Model 
1), as well as the less restrictive version proposed by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal in 
equation [3] (Model 2). Vector x contains time-varying variables; in our case we include 
the log of the average productivity of the firm relative to that of its industry, as an 
indicator of the firms proximity to the industry productivity frontier (Log Rel Prod). 
Time constant variables such as industry (High Tech) and size (Size +200) dummies 
among others can be included as well, although in this case their coefficients will 
capture a combination of the correlation with the unobserved individual effect and the 
partial effect on y.19  
 
Table 4 shows these results, and for comparison, those of a pooled bivariate probit 
(Model 3). Estimates of Model 1 show that program participation exhibits positive state-
dependence: the coefficient of lagged subsidy in the subsidy equation, and of lagged tax 
credit in the tax credit equation, are highly significant. True persistence accounts for 
about 55% of the variance of the composite error in the case of subsidies, and for 60% 
in the case of tax credits. This result supports the hypothesis of success-breeds-success. 
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 All variable definitions are shown on Table A1 in the appendix. 
 Unbalanced panel Balanced panel 
 R&D Subsidy R&D Tax Incentives R&D Subsidy R&D Tax Incentives 
One year 36% 33% 33% 22% 
Two years 25% 25% 17% 21% 
Three years 12% 12% 10% 11% 
Four years or more 27% 30% 41% 46% 
Total 100 100 100 100 
17 
 
The initial value of subsidy status (tax credit status) in the subsidy equation (tax credit 
equation) is also highly significant, which indicates that unobserved heterogeneity and 
the initial condition of the corresponding dependent variable are correlated. Unobserved 
heterogeneity accounts for a substantial share of persistence: 45% in the case of 
subsidies and 39% in that of tax credits. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ] 
It turns out that highly productive firms within a given industry are more likely to obtain 
subsidies, while this feature does not appear to influence the likelihood of obtaining tax 
credits. The public agency ends up providing support to firms that are closer to the 
technology frontier, suggesting that possibly publicly funded projects are of an 
exploratory nature. We do not observe this association in the case of tax credits, hinting 
that they are less likely to discriminate across projects. Since firms will on average 
choose projects that maximize expected private profits, exploitation rather than 
exploration projects are more likely to be preferred. In line with Ackcigit et al. (2014), 
this would lead to overinvestment in projects that generate less spillovers, and therefore 
to inefficient allocations.  
 
We do not find significant cross-program feedback effects, as we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that 12 22 0γ γ= = : having participated in one program does not make 
participation in the other more likely, once we control for observed and unobserved 
individual characteristics. We interpret this result as evidence that on average each 
program reaches different types of firms whose projects are likely to be heterogeneous 
as well. Firms that engage in privately profitable R&D would benefit from tax credits 
and would not have a further incentive to engage in projects eligible for direct support. 
On the other hand, firms whose projects benefit from direct support would not, on 
average, claim tax credits possibly because they may not obtain profits in the short run. 
This would be consistent with the public agency selecting projects that generate 
knowledge spillovers but have limited immediate private returns. 20  
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 Note that the error terms u1i and u2i are positively correlated, implying that joint estimation of both 
equations is more efficient than individual estimation. 
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Some further results provide interesting insights on firms' participation patterns. First, 
firm size increases the likelihood of participating in any of the two programs; on 
average these do not seem to be able to offset the barriers that SMEs face to engage in 
R&D. Low profits and application costs may respectively harm their access to tax 
credits and subsidies, but it is also possible that entry costs are higher than the expected 
tax deduction or expected subsidy. Second, being in a high-tech industry is also 
correlated with the probability of participation in any program. These results are 
consistent with Roberts and Vuong (2013), who through a simulation exercise find that 
the expected benefits from R&D investment vary across firms with different 
productivity levels, and across high-tech and low tech industries, and that R&D cost 
reductions affect them differently. This would show up in program participation 
incentives.  
 
When we estimate the Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal version of the model, allowing for 
different coefficients for the initial period of relative productivity (Model 2), we find 
that the main parameters’ estimates are practically the same.21 Both in Model 1 and 
Model 2 we find strong, significant state dependence of each instrument, but no 
evidence of cross-program effects. Model 3 shows that a simple pooled bivariate model 
overestimates own state-dependence as well as cross-program dependence, a standard 
result when individual heterogeneity is ignored.   
 
We test whether other observed firm features are associated to the probability of 
participating in each program, besides relative productivity Some are time-invariant. 
The first is the condition of performing R&D at the beginning of the period (RD_t0). 
This variable can inform on the ability of the programs to attract non-performers 
relative to incumbents. We find that participation in any of the programs is highly 
correlated with being an R&D performer at the beginning of the period, supporting the 
hypothesis that incumbents are more likely to benefit from these tools (Model 4 in 
Table 5).  
 
We next investigate whether being a young firm -a firm born after 1995, so that at the 
beginning of our period it would be 6 years old or younger- is associated with 
                                                           
21Relative productivity is the only time-varying independent variable included in this specification. 
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participation (Model 5 in Table 5). According to our estimation, the probability of 
young firms participating is not different from that of older firms. These results point 
that both programs do not succeed at attracting more manufacturing firms to engage in 
R&D activities, at least during this period, although they might have helped incumbent 
firms to maintain their investment.22 They also highlight the importance of broader 
framework conditions for the success of innovation-specific policies, as research 
suggests. 23 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
Other firm observed features that may shape program participation incentives are a 
firm's human capital -an indicator of ability to undertake creative, high quality projects-, 
the extent of diversification -an indicator of incentives to engage in exploitation rather 
than exploration R&D, according to Akcigit and Kerr (2014)-, and the firm's market 
share or its evolution. Models 6 in Table 5 and Models 7 to 9 in Table 6 show our 
estimation results. A time invariant, binary indicator of having no employees with 
higher education (No humanK) shows a negative and significant coefficient;24 
interestingly, having more than one product line (Diversify) is positively correlated with 
the likelihood of using tax credits, while has no significant relation with obtaining direct 
support. This result is again consistent with Akcigit and Kerr's: diversified firms are 
likely to engage in exploitation R&D, which is a safer activity and more likely to 
generate profits in the short run, against which tax credits can be claimed. In contrast, 
diversification is not associated with obtaining subsidies.  
 
Experiencing a growing market share (Mkt Share), and the firm's perception of being 
among the top three firms in its market (Top 3 pos) do not appear to be related to 
participation in subsidy programs. However, in the tax credit participation equation they 
are correlated with individual heterogeneity (Models 8 and 9 in Table 6).  
 
Many studies have documented that a firm's ability to innovate is affected by the 
availability of own funds. We would thus expect constrained firms to be more likely to 
                                                           
22
 In that respect, it is important to recall that at that time Spain was experiencing a strong growth period 
that was driven mostly by the expansion of the construction industry, where returns to investment where 
very high and innovation opportunities low. The two innovation instruments analyzed would not able to 
offset this effect. We unfortunately cannot perform this same analysis for service sector firms. 
23
 See for instance Westmore (2013) and Wang (2013). 
24The percent of employees with a higher education degree shows practically no within variation.  
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use anyone or both support programs. To test this we define and include in our 
estimation an indicator of the firm's situation in this respect: the ratio between own 
funds and its short run debt (Own funds/Debt). We find that although this variable is not 
directly related to participation, it shows a negative correlation with the individual 
heterogeneity term in the case of subsidies, implying that firms with own funds are less 
likely to apply for direct support (Model 10 in Table 7). This result is consistent with 
Busom et al. (2014), who find that the likelihood of obtaining R&D subsidies is 
positively related to innovation-specific financing constraints. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
As an additional control for the possibility that participation dependence is driven 
mostly by R&D persistence, we estimate the model restricting the sample to those firms 
that perform R&D at least once during the 2002-2008 period (Model 11 in Table 7). 
This cuts down the sample in half, as 355 out of 779 firms (46% of the balanced panel) 
fulfill this condition.25 About 30% of them claim tax deductions (107 firms) and 25% 
(90 firms) obtain a subsidy. We find that our main coefficients of interest, state 
dependence and cross program interaction barely change, as estimates are very close to 
those obtained with Model 1. The conclusions that previous program participation 
increases the likelihood of continued participation, that cross-program spillovers are 
quite weak, and that a high relative productivity increases the likelihood of receiving 
subsidies but not of claiming tax credits, hold.  
 
We finally explore whether a particular type of firms, those that export and innovate, are 
more likely to participate in an R&D program (Model 12 in Table 7). In the period 
studied the corresponding indicator practically does not vary, so we include it as time-
invariant variable. We find that there is a positive correlation between this indicator and 
claiming R&D tax credits, but not with subsidies. We interpret this result as support for 
the hypothesis that commercially successful innovators are more likely to claim tax 
credits because the returns of their R&D projects are sufficiently appropriable, and are 
unlikely to exhibit significant spillovers.  
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 Half of them, in turn, conduct R&D every year of the period. 
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As a final exercise, we look into the possibility that participation is driven by higher 
order dynamic process. As explained above, two arguments would justify estimating a 
model that includes a second lag of each dependent variable. The first is that firms may 
carryover tax credit claims, and the second is that direct support may be awarded for 
more than one year. Both would tend to generate state dependence. Given our relatively 
limited number of firms, however, our results (shown in appendix 2) suggest that this 
specification may be over-fitting our data: the non-significance of the variance of the 
individual random effect in the tax equation may reflect model misspecification.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
6. Conclusions 
Understanding why and which firms participate in R&D program support programs, 
whether participation leads to continued participation, and whether a particular program 
triggers participation in a second one are important issues for a comprehensive policy 
evaluation. In this paper we extend current research on the effectiveness of innovation 
policies by bringing the focus on the dynamics of firm participation in R&D support 
programs, explicitly comparing R&D subsidies -direct support- with R&D tax 
incentives -indirect support-.  
 
Standard impact analysis -the extent of input or output additionality associated with 
public support- is not sufficient to make inferences about the contribution of these 
policies to increasing welfare. Crowding out -negative additionality- clearly reduces 
welfare, but positive additionality does not necessarily increase it, and given the 
opportunity cost of public resources, it might even reduce it. This will depend on the 
nature of underlying market failures -limited appropriability, financing constraints- and 
on the success of the support allocation mechanism in spotting the R&D projects most 
affected by them. Hence, the support allocation mechanism itself is of interest. We here 
extend work by Busom et al. (2014 by asking whether a stable pool of firms 
systematically benefits from each program, and whether participating in one of the 
programs acts as a springboard for participating in the other. This may contribute to 
uncover potential and unwanted distortions in the allocation of public resources to 
supporting private innovation. 
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Our main contributions and their implications can be summarized as follows. First, we 
find significant true state persistence of participation in R&D subsidy and tax credit 
programs; it accounts for about 55% of the unexplained variance of the composite error 
in the case of subsidies, and 60% in the case of tax credits –the rest being driven by 
unobserved heterogeneity. Second, we do not find evidence of cross-program 
interactions, controlling for other variables. The extent of state dependence particularly 
in the use of tax credits, their limited ability to induce the use of subsidies, and their 
correlation with market success indicators suggests that the projects beneficiary firms 
engage in would possibly have been carried out even without support. In income-based 
designs the ability to claim derives from commercial success; therefore, knowledge 
spillovers are likely to be small enough not to deter innovation effort in the first place. 
Consequently, there is room for misallocation of public resources, and our results show 
that any misallocation incurred in at one point in time is likely to persist, inducing long 
run negative welfare effects.26 When tax incentives are income based, as is the case in 
Spain and many other countries, looking into the nature of claimants’ R&D projects 
would be of particular interest. Furthermore, given that firms must be able to finance 
their projects with internal or external funds before claiming tax credits, it is also likely 
that most of them do not face serious financing constraints for innovating. There would 
thus be in principle little point in using this type of scheme unless it is restricted to pre-
competitive R&D –often associated to collaborative R&D. 
 
Among different observed firm features, firm size, being in a high tech industry, human 
capital and being an R&D performer at the beginning of the period, all increase the 
probability of participating in any of the two programs. Incumbents are thus more likely 
to respond to both types of incentives, as Aschhoff found in the German case. We also 
find that the correlation between some observable firm features and the probability of 
using on program or the other varies across programs. Higher productivity than the 
industry average is associated with obtaining R&D subsidies, but not with claiming tax 
credits. Participation in a subsidy program is also indirectly related to experiencing 
financing constraints. In the same vein, some factors increase the likelihood of claiming 
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 Mistakes in the allocation of subsidies may be more easily corrected, as the public agency decides on a 
case by case basis, and has more information on the nature of R&D projects as well as the ability to 
monitor the project at different stages, particularly when the duration of a project is longer than one year.  
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R&D tax credits but not subsidies: these are whether the firm has more than one 
production line -which is presumably associated with exploitation R&D projects 
(Akcigit and Kerr (2013))-, experiencing a growing market share and being among the 
market leaders.  
 
These reflections would call for a careful ex-post evaluation of each policy tool, 
encompassing both participation and impact analysis in order to uncover systematic 
misallocations. By pinpointing the high persistence of program participation, our 
findings highlight the need to extend ex-post evaluation of innovation policy effects 
beyond conventional measures of additionality and integrating allocation analysis in 
these studies.27 To this end, information on the type of R&D projects firms that claim 
tax credits carry out, particularly their duration and indicators of their nature –
exploratory versus exploitation content-, would be very valuable.  
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 While subsidy schemes may easily allow for adjusting eligibility requirements such that allocations 
errors can be corrected, this may be harder to achieve with R&D tax credits. 
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Table 4. Dynamic Bivariate Probit Estimation I. Baseline. 
 
 
Model 1 
Mundlak-Baseline 
Model 2 
Rabe-Hesketh& Skrondal 
Model 3 
Pooled Bivariate Probit 
 Coef s.e. z Coef s.e. z Coef s.e. z 
Subsidies          
Tax credit
 t_1 0.120 0.145 0.83 0.123 0.147 0.84 0.215** 0.098 2.19 
Tax credit t0 0.508*** 0.166 3.05 0.504*** 0.167 3.01 0.211** 0.104 2.04 
Subv t_1 1.360*** 0.129 10.56 1.362*** 0.129 10.57 2.012*** 0.117 17.18 
subvt0 1.592*** 0.215 7.41 1.581*** 0.215 7.37 0.654*** 0.113 5.79 
Log Rel Prod 
t_1 
0.403** 0.183 2.2 0.409** 0.183 2.23 0.330** 0.147 2.24 
Mdistprod -0.133 0.207 -0.64    -0.168 0.157 -1.07 
Log Rel Prod
 t0    -0.231 0.221 -1.04    
Rdistprod    0.081 0.271 0.3    
Size +200 0.569*** 0.118 4.83 0.568*** 0.118 4.82 0.403*** 0.083 4.84 
High Tech 0.480*** 0.182 2.63 0.489*** 0.183 2.67 0.324*** 0.117 2.78 
Cons -2.826*** 0.147 -19.19 -2.851*** 0.151 -18.82 -2.201*** 0.056 -39.08 
       
   
Tax Credits          
Tax credit
 t_1 1.552*** 0.109 14.25 1.554*** 0.109 14.25 1.954*** 0.086 22.7 
Tax credit t0 0.913*** 0.151 6.02 0.911*** 0.151 6.04 0.424*** 0.091 4.67 
Subv t_1 0.070 0.142 0.5 0.074 0.143 0.52 0.228** 0.099 2.31 
subvt0 0.575*** 0.158 3.63 0.563*** 0.157 3.57 0.269*** 0.108 2.5 
Log Rel Prod 
t_1 
0.012 0.148 0.08 0.031 0.148 0.21 0.035 0.136 0.25 
Mdistprod 0.359** 0.166 2.16    0.234 0.149 1.57 
Log Rel Prod t0    -0.301* 0.176 -1.71    
Rdistprod    0.622*** 0.215 2.89    
Size +200 0.439*** 0.096 4.56 0.433*** 0.096 4.52 0.331*** 0.073 4.51 
High Tech 0.716*** 0.140 5.1 0.735*** 0.141 5.22 0.504*** 0.097 5.21 
_cons -2.476*** 0.110 -22.46 -2.516*** 0.114 -22.05 -2.089*** 0.054 -38.56 
       
   
Rho 0.483*** 0.085 5.69 0.485*** 0.085 5.68 0.458*** 0.066 6.87 
 Sigma ε1 0.847*** 0.106 8.01 0.842*** 0.106 7.96    
Sigma ε2 0.643*** 0.088 7.34 0.629*** 0.087 7.23    
Rho ε 0.467*** 0.162 2.87 0.455*** 0.169 2.69    
LogLik -1760.12   -1757.99   -1799.07   
N obs (firms) 5453 (779)   
5453 
(779)   
5453 
(779) 
  
Notes: The correlation of individual effects for subsidy equation in Model 1 is rhoε1 = corr(ε1t,ε1s) = 
.84/(1+.84) = 45%; rhoε2 = corr(ε2t,ε2s) = .64/(1+.64)= 39%.  In Model 2 they are practically identical to 
those of Model 1. 
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Table 5. Dynamic Bivariate Probit Estimation II.  
 
Model 4 
Control for Initial RD 
 
Model 5 
Control for Young 
Model 6 
Control for lack of skill 
 Coef s.e. z Coef s.e. z Coef s.e. z 
Subsidies          
Tax credit t-1 0.108 0.148 0.72 0.122 0.144 0.85 0.118 0.144 0.82 
Tax credit t0 0.256 0.161 1.59 0.509*** 0.166 3.06 0.435* 0.163 2.67 
Subv t_1 1.368*** 0.130 10.51 1.353*** 0.129 10.52 1.375*** 0.127 10.77 
subvt0 1.325*** 0.208 6.38 1.596*** 0.216 7.4 1.527*** 0.210 7.24 
Log Rel Prod 
t_1 
0.396** 0.187 2.12 0.404** 0.183 2.2 0.391** 0.182 2.14 
Mdistprod -0.180 0.210 -0.86 -0.133 0.207 -0.64 -0.189 0.205 -0.92 
 
   
 
     
No humanK    
 
  -0.498*** 0.178 -2.79 
Young    0.073 0.295 0.25    
RD t0 0.747*** 0.153 4.88       
Size +200 0.428*** 0.119 3.59 0.568*** 0.118 4.82 0.467*** 0.119 3.9 
High Tech 0.372** 0.175 2.13 0.482*** 0.183 2.64 0.416** 0.179 2.33 
Cons -3.007*** 0.168 -17.89 -2.831*** 0.148 - -2.637*** 0.146 -17.96 
 
   .      
Tax Credits          
Tax credit t_1 1.534*** 0.110 13.94 1.548*** 0.108 14.29 1.537*** 0.109 14.1 
Tax credit
 t0 0.612*** 0.136 4.49 0.914*** 0.151 6.06 0.837*** 0.149 5.59 
Subv t_1 0.079 0.147 0.54 0.075 0.142 0.53 0.088 0.142 0.62 
subvt0 0.281* 0.150 1.87 0.584*** 0.159 3.67 0.528*** 0.157 3.36 
Log Rel Prod 
t_1 
-0.012 0.150 -0.08 0.008 0.148 0.06 0.005 0.147 0.04 
Mdistprod 0.308* 0.168 1.84 0.364** 0.166 2.19 0.284* 0.166 1.71 
 
   
   
 
  
No humanK        -0.689*** 0.166 -4.14 
Young    -0.361 0.285 -1.26    
RD t0 0.827*** 0.115 7.21       
Size +200 0.285*** 0.094 3.03 0.434*** 0.096 4.52 0.323*** 0.097 3.32 
High Tech 0.547*** 0.134 4.07 0.713*** 0.140 5.08 0.645*** 0.138 4.64 
Cons -2.645*** 0.123 -21.44 -2.465*** 0.110 -22.51 -2.272*** 0.109 -20.72 
 
   
      
Rho 0.479*** 0.088 5.42 0.485*** 0.085 5.72 0.483*** 0.085 5.66 
Sigma ε1 0.815*** 0.109 7.45 0.848*** 0.106 8.03 0.827*** 0.104 7.9 
Sigma ε2 0.549*** 0.090 6.08 0.642*** 0.087 7.42 0.630*** 0.089 7.05 
Rho ε 0.360* 0.205 1.76 0.468*** 0.162 2.9 0.430** 0.167 2.57 
LogLik -1701.28   -1759.08   -1747.25   
N obs (firms) 5432 (776)   
5453 
(779)   
5453 
(779)   
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Table 6. Dynamic Bivariate Probit Estimation III. 
 
Model 7 
Control for Not diversifying 
Model 8 
Growing market share 
Model 9 
Market position 
 Coef s.e. z Coef s.e. z Coef s.e. z 
Subsidies          
Tax credit t_1 0.123 0.143 0.86 0.104 0.142 0.73 0.109 0.142 0.77 
Tax credit t0 0.514*** 0.168 3.06 0.496*** 0.164 3.02 0.500*** 0.164 3.04 
Subv t_1 1.342*** 0.127 10.57 1.392*** 0.128 10.84 1.383*** 0.128 10.79 
subvt0 1.649*** 0.218 7.57 1.542*** 0.211 7.3 1.564*** 0.215 7.27 
Divers t_1 -0.228 0.183 -1.25       
MDivers 0.365 0.265 1.38       
Mkt Share t-1    0.112 0.108 1.03    
MMkt Share    0.369 0.261 1.42    
Top 3 pos       0.208 0.223 0.93 
MTop 3       -0.010 0.119 -0.09 
Size +200 0.689*** 0.117 5.9 0.653*** 0.113 5.79 0.624*** 0.114 5.43 
High Tech 0.435** 0.187 2.32 0.438** 0.177 2.48 0.450** 0.179 2.51 
Cons -3.024*** 0.229 -13.23 -2.943*** 0.158 -18.64 -2.866*** 0.167 -17.10 
 
   
   
 
 
 
Tax Credits          
Tax credit
 t_1 1.534*** 0.108 14.17 1.555*** 0.109 14.24 1.555*** 0.108 14.39 
Tax credit t0 0.977*** 0.157 6.24 0.921*** 0.155 5.96 0.898*** 0.150 5.96 
Subv t_1 0.073 0.142 0.51 0.087 0.142 0.61 0.076 0.142 0.54 
subvt0 0.566*** 0.161 3.52 0.544*** 0.158 3.44 0.547*** 0.158 3.46 
Divers t_1 -0.340** 0.156 -2.18       
MDivers 0.230 0.218 1.05       
Mkt Share t-1    0.121 0.096 1.27    
Mkt Share    0.547** 0.214 2.56    
Top 3 pos       0.044 0.145 0.31 
MTop3       0.577*** 0.182 3.16 
Size +200 0.590*** 0.099 5.98 0.588*** 0.095 6.19 0.479*** 0.094 5.06 
High Tech 0.700*** 0.144 4.85 0.700*** 0.141 4.95 0.700*** 0.141 4.97 
Const -2.490*** 0.169 -14.71 -2.693*** 0.128 -21.09 -2.616** 0.138 -18.86 
 
   
   
   
Rho 0.485*** 0.084 5.75 0.479*** 0.083 5.75 0.480*** 0.083 5.75 
Sigma ε1 0.866*** 0.104 8.36 0.815*** 0.104 7.86 0.825*** 0.104 7.98 
Sigma ε2 0.687*** 0.088 7.85 0.649*** 0.089 7.28 0.632*** 0.087 7.25 
Rho ε 0.442*** 0.145 3.05 0.461*** 0.160 2.89 0.481*** 0.163 2.94 
LogLik -1774.37   -1769.40   -1750.34   
N obs 
(firms) 
5453 
(779)   
5453 
(779)   
5453 
(779)   
Note: Model 9 includes a dummy variable to take into account missing values for the variable Top 3 in 
order to keep the same number of observations as in the other models. 
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Table 7. Dynamic Bivariate Probit Estimation IV 
 Model 10 
Own funds/Short run debt 
Model 11: subsample 
Firms that do R&D at least 
once during the period  
Model 11 
Model 12 
Exporters that introduced 
a new product 
 
 Coef s.e. z Coef s.e. z Coef s.e. z 
Subsidies          
Tax credit t_1 0.134 0.145 0.93 0.217 0.141 1.53 0.212 0.156 1.36 
Tax credit
 t0 0.504*** 0.170 2.96 0.136 0.152 0.9 0.363** 0.163 2.23 
Subv t_1 1.363*** 0.133 10.23 1.329*** 0.129 10.24 1.385*** 0.141 9.82 
subvt0 1.557*** 0.227 6.86 1.234*** 0.198 6.22 1.604*** 0.242 6.62 
Log Rel Prod 
t_1 
   0.411** 0.193 2.13 0.399** 0.186 2.15 
Mdistprod    -0.365* 0.220 -1.66 
-0.116 0.209 -0.56 
Own 
funds/SRdebt t-1 
 
0.007 0.020 0.32       
MOf/SRdebt -0.092*** 0.038 -2.39       
InnovExport       0.204 0.129 1.59 
Size +200 0.622*** 0.116 5.36 0.299** 0.117 2.55 0.461*** 0.119 3.89 
High Tech 0.391** 0.168 2.32 0.350** 0.162 2.16 0.647*** 0.171 3.8 
cons -2.654*** 0.150 -17.72 -2.064*** 0.124 -16.64 -2.81*** 0.157 -17.95 
 
         
Tax Credits          
Tax credit
 t_1 1.576*** 0.114 13.88 1.584*** 0.114 13.89 1.561*** 0.112 13.88 
Tax credit t0 0.911*** 0.158 5.78 0.522**** 0.133 3.93 0.773*** 0.151 5.12 
Subv t_1 0.104 0.157 0.66 0.170 0.145 1.18 0.135 0.160 0.85 
subvt0 0.513*** 0.170 3.02 0.261* 0.138 1.89 0.484*** 0.164 2.96 
Log Rel Prod 
t_1 
   0.016 0.157 0.1 -0.005 0.149 -0.03 
Mdistprod    0.200 0.176 1.14 0.358*** 0.170 2.11 
Own 
funds/SRdebt 
-0.022 0.018 -1.22       
MOf/SRdebt 0.006 0.019 0.31       
InnovExport       0.391*** 0.102 3.82 
Size +200 0.570*** 0.098 5.84 0.184** 0.092 2.0 0.425*** 0.099 4.29 
High Tech 0.617*** 0.142 4.35 0.569*** 0.129 4.39 0.805*** 0.147 5.46 
cons -2.450*** 0.115 -21.37 -1.791*** 0.093 -19.15 -2.558*** 0.121 -21.23 
 
         
Rho 0.517*** 0.089 5.83 0.514*** 0.087 5.89 0.47*** 0.098 4.81 
Sigma ε1 0.804*** 0.103 7.81 0.727*** 0.107 6.78 0.795*** 0.121 6.58 
Sigma ε2 0.626*** 0.090 6.93 0.458*** 0.0976 4.69 0.615*** 0.092 6.7 
Rho ε 0.430*** 0.171 2.51 0.050 0.2246 0.23 0.259 0.198 1.31 
LogLik -1673.02   -1563.03   -1649.93   
N obs (firms) 5054 (722)   
2485 
(355)   
5278 
(754)   
Note: In some models a small number of observations are lost because of missing data for the relevant 
variable. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Variable definition 
Variable  
Tax Credit Binary; 1 if the firm claims a tax credit in year t 
Subsidy Binary; 1 if the firm receives a subsidy in year t 
Tax credit t_1 Binary; 1 if the firm claimed a tax credit in year t-1 
Tax credit t0 Binary; 1 if the firm claimed a tax credit year 2001 
Subv t_1 Binary; 1 if the firm received a s subsidy in year t-1 
subvt0 Binary; 1 if the firm received a subsidy in initial period 
Log Rel Prod t_1 Log of relative productivity: log of sales per employee/average sales peremployee of firms in the same industry, at t-1  
Mdistprod Within mean of the log of relative productivity from t0 to T. 
Log Rel Prod t0 Log of relative productivity at initial period 
Rdistprod Within mean of the log of relative productivity from t1 to T 
Young Binary; 1 if firm was born after 1995 
RD t0 Binary; 1 if firm was investing in R&D at t0 
NoDiverst_1 Binary; 1 if firm does not diversify products 
MDivers Within mean of not diversifying  
Mkt Share t-1 Binary; 1 if market share is growing 
MMkt Share Within mean of growing market share 
Top 3 positiont-1 Binary; 1 if firm is one of the top 3 in its market 
MTop 3 Within mean of  Top 3 position 
Own funds/SRdebt
 t-1 Ratio of own funds to short run debt 
MOf/SRD Within mean of the ratio of own funds to short run debt 
No humanK Binary; 1 if firm does not have higher education graduates 
Innov*Export Binary; 1 if the firm introduced a innovation and exported at t-1 
Size +200 Binary; 1 if the firm has more than 200 employees 
High Tech Binary; 1 if the firm is in the high tech industries 
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Table A2. One-lag transition rates 
 Subsidy status at t+1 Tax Credit status at t+1 R&D status at t+1 
Status at t No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Unbalanced panel       
No 97% 3% 97% 3% 96% 4% 
Yes 22% 78% 25% 75% 10% 90% 
Balanced panel       
No 97% 3% 97% 3% 97% 3% 
Yes 20% 80% 24% 76% 8% 92% 
Balanced panel 
Firms that conduct R&D  
at least one year 
      
No 92% 8% 91% 9% 86% 14% 
Yes 21% 79% 26% 74% 6% 94% 
 
Table A3. Two-lag transition rates.  
  Status at t+2 
Status at t N. Observ No support Only Subs Only Tax 
Credit 
Both Total 
Unbalanced panel       
No support 6463 94.4 2.2 2.6 0.8 100 
Only Subs 356 33.4 44.7 3.4 18.5 100 
Only Tax Credit 590 38.1 3.4 45.9 12.5 100 
Both 477 10.9 16.9 12.6 59.5 100 
Total Obs 7886      
Balanced panel        
No support 3779 94.3 2.2 2.7 0.8 100 
Only Subs 205 32.7 48.3 1.5 17.6 100 
Only Tax Credit 379 40.6 2.4 46.4 10.5 100 
Both 317 10.4 16.1 12 61.5 100 
Total Obs 4680 81.6 5.1 6.9 6.4 100 
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Table A4. Dynamic Bivariate Probit Estimation. Balanced Panel. 
 Model 1: RE biv, 1lag Model 2: RE biv 2lags Model 3: Pooled biv probit 
 Coef Sd t-stat Coef Sd t-stat Coef Sd t-stat 
Subsidies          
Tax credit t_1 0.120 0.145 0.83 0.179 0.142 1.25 0.185 0.126 1.46 
Tax credit t_2 
   
-0.001 0.135 -0.01 0.005 0.131 0.04 
Tax credit t0 0.508*** 0.166 3.05 0.219* 0.127 1.72 0.185* 0.111 1.67 
Subv t_1 1.360*** 0.129 10.56 1.747*** 0.129 13.47 1.810*** 0.111 16.19 
Subv t_2 
   
0.535*** 0.130 4.11 0.570*** 0.118 4.82 
Subv t0 1.592*** 0.215 7.41 0.643*** 0.177 3.63 0.521*** 0.118 4.4 
Log Rel Prod t_1 0.403** 0.183 2.2 0.453** 0.180 2.51 0.444*** 0.170 2.6 
MLog Rel Prod  
-0.133 0.207 -0.64 -0.267 0.194 -1.38 -0.270 0.175 -1.54 
Large firm 0.569*** 0.118 4.83 0.402*** 0.090 4.45 0.373*** 0.083 4.46 
High-Tech 0.480*** 0.182 2.63 0.320** 0.125 2.56 0.289** 0.123 2.35 
constant 
-2.826*** 0.147 -19.19 - 0.111 -20.64 -2.222*** 0.057 -38.37 
          
Tax Credits          
Tax credit t_1 1.552*** 0.109 14.25 1.786*** 0.104 17.06 1.803*** 0.101 17.81 
Tax credit t_2 
   
0.382*** 0.110 3.46 0.396*** 0.112 3.51 
Tax credit t0 0.913*** 0.151 6.02 0.362*** 0.120 3.01 0.326*** 0.095 3.44 
Subv t_1 0.070 0.142 0.5 0.085 0.145 0.59 0.114 0.132 0.86 
Subv t_2 
   
0.159 0.142 1.12 0.169 0.126 1.34 
Subv t0 0.575*** 0.158 3.63 0.229* 0.137 1.66 0.190* 0.107 1.78 
Log Rel Prod t_1 0.012 0.148 0.08 0.027 0.153 0.18 0.035 0.155 0.23 
MLog Rel Prod0 0.359** 0.166 2.16 0.261 0.165 1.58 0.245 0.169 1.45 
Large firm 0.439*** 0.096 4.56 0.290*** 0.079 3.66 0.277*** 0.075 3.68 
High tech sector 0.716*** 0.140 5.1 0.448*** 0.111 4.01 0.428*** 0.096 4.42 
constant 
-2.476*** 0.110 -22.46 - 0.085 -25.14 -2.128*** 0.056 -37.87 
          
Rho 0.483*** 0.085 5.69 0.518*** 0.088 5.87 0.478*** 0.054  
Sigma ε1 0.847*** 0.106 8.01 0.266* 0.154 1.73    
Sigma ε2 0.643*** 0.088 7.34 0.166 0.175 0.95    
Rho ε 0.467*** 0.162 2.87 0.615 1.667 0.37    
LogLikelihood 
-1760.12   -1471.65   -1472.37   
N obs (firms) 5453 (779)   
4674 
(779)   
4674 
 (779)   
Notes: The correlation of individual effects for subsidy equation in Model 1 is rhoε1 = corr(ε1t,ε1s) = 
.811/(1+.811) = 45%; rhoε2 = corr(ε2t,ε2s) = .553/(1+.553)= 36%.  Model 2: rhoε1 = corr(ε1t,ε1s)== 
.26/(1+.26) = 21%; rhoε2 is not significant.  
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